Comments: The Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege in Maryland after Upjohn and the Recent Corporate Scandals: Where Do the Maryland Courts Go from Here? by Watt, Jami M.
University of Baltimore Law Review
Volume 37
Issue 3 Spring 2008 Article 8
2008
Comments: The Corporate Attorney-Client
Privilege in Maryland after Upjohn and the Recent
Corporate Scandals: Where Do the Maryland
Courts Go from Here?
Jami M. Watt
University of Baltimore School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/ublr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
University of Baltimore Law Review by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For more information,
please contact snolan@ubalt.edu.
Recommended Citation
Watt, Jami M. (2008) "Comments: The Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege in Maryland after Upjohn and the Recent Corporate
Scandals: Where Do the Maryland Courts Go from Here?," University of Baltimore Law Review: Vol. 37: Iss. 3, Article 8.
Available at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/ublr/vol37/iss3/8
THE CORPORATE ATTORNEY -CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN 
MARYLAND AFTER UPJOHN AND THE RECENT 
CORPORATE SCANDALS: WHERE DO THE 
MARYLAND COURTS GO FROM HERE? 
I. AN INTRODUCTION TO THE CORPORATE ATTORNEY-
CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND THE MULTIPLE TESTS 
The attorney-client privilege serves to protect and promote 
communications between clients and lawyers. According to the 
Supreme Court in Upjohn Co. v. United States, I the purpose of the 
attorney-client privilege "is to encourage full and frank 
communication between attorneys and their clients and thereby 
promote broader public interests in the observance of law and 
administration of justice.,,2 This privilege only covers 
"communications between lawyer and client in which the client is 
seeking legal advice or other legal services.,,3 
For a communication to be covered under the attorney-client 
privilege, the following five factors must be present: "(1) a client, (2) 
a lawyer, (3) a retainer for the purpose of rendering legal advice, (4) a 
communication between them and (5) an intent that the 
communication be confidential. ,-;4 This privilege is available to both 
individual and corporate clients.s 
Prior to the decision in Upjohn, there were two primary tests used 
by the federal courts, as well as the courts of individual states, to 
determine if a communication in the corporate setting was covered 
under the corporate attorney-client privilege.6 The first test, the 
control group test, "limits the privilege to communications from 
1. 449 U.S. 383 (1981). 
2. Id. at 389. 
3. LISA G. LERMAN & PHILIP G. SCHRAG, ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW 
166 (2005). 
4. Dennis J. Black & Nancy E. Barton, Implications of the Attorney-Client Privilege 
and Work-Product Doctrine, in INTERNAL CORPORATE INVESTIGATIONS 17, 22-23 
(Brad D. Brian & Barry F. McNeil eds., 2d ed. 2003). 
5. LERMAN & SCHRAG, supra note 3, at 176. 
6. See Michael L. Waldman, Beyond Upjohn: The Attorney-Client Privilege in the 
Corporate Context, 28 WM. & MARY L. REV. 473,474 (1987) (stating that the "two 
major tests" which emerged in the 1960s and the 1970s were the control group test 
and the subject matter test); see also Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 386 (stating that "two 
'tests' [had] gained adherents in the courts of appeals"). 
497 
498 Baltimore Law Review Vol. 37 
persons in the organization who have authority to mold 
organizational policy or to take action in accordance with the 
lawyer's advice.,,7 The second test, the subject matter test, "extends 
the privilege to communications with any [management or] lower-
echelon employee or agent so long as the communication relates to 
the subject matter of the representation."s 
Before l{fjohn, the control group test was thought to be the test of 
the future. In the Upjohn case, however, the Supreme Court held 
that the subject matter test was more a~propriate, and therefore, it 
should be followed by all federal courts. I Where the Supreme Court 
failed in its Upjohn decision was its choice not to specifically layout 
the factors that should be used to detennine if a communication is 
covered under the chosen subject matter test. I I 
As the Supreme Court's Upjohn decision was a federal decision, it 
is not binding authority on the individual states. 12 As such, some 
states have chosen to follow the Supreme Court's lead and apply the 
subject matter approach, while others have decided to continue with 
their application of the control group test. 13 The Court of Appeals of 
Maryland, however, has specifically declined to choose a test until 
the court detennines it is necessary to do so; 14 therefore, an analysis 
of the two tests, the control group and the subject matter tests, will 
likely be perfonned by the Maryland courts in the future. 
This Comment will discuss the rationale behind the Court's 
adoption of the subject matter test, while comparing this decision 
with that of some states to continue adhering to the control group test 
and that of yet other states adofting a version of the subject matter 
test that differs from Upjohn. I These different approaches are all 
options the Maryland courts will need to analyze when faced with 
choosing which test should be applied to detennine whether or not a 
given communication is protected under the corporate attorney-client 
privilege. 
7. LERMAN & SCHRAG, supra note 3, at 180 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW 
GOVERNING LAWYERS § 73 cmt. d (2000». 
8. ld. (alteration in original) (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING 
LAWYERS § 73 cmt. d (footnotes omitted». 
9. JOHN WILLIAM GERGACZ, ATTORNEy-CORPORATE CLIENT PRIVILEGE 3-133 (3d ed. 
2001). 
10. LERMAN & SCHRAG, supra note 3, at 176; Upjohn, 449 U.S. 383. 
11. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 386. 
12. GERGACZ, supra note 9, at 3-170. 
13. LERMAN & SCHRAG, supra note 3, at 180. 
14. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Forma-Pack, Inc., 351 Md. 396, 421, 718 A.2d 
1129, 1141 (1998). 
15. See infra Parts III, IV, V. 
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Further considerations have also arisen as a result of the corporate 
scandals of the past ten years. The consequences of the recent 
scandals have forced corporations to waive the attorney-client 
privilege and provide as much information as possible to government 
prosecutors in order for a corporation to be deemed cooperative in an 
investigation of an alleged wrongdoing. 16 As such, employees are 
often left unprotected as corporations simply tum over their 
statements to prosecutors, leading to self-incrimination and other 
constitutional issues. 17 Therefore, the Maryland courts should also 
consider these recent events in determining which test should be 
applied to ensure a corporation's employees are adequately protected. 
This Comment will also consider Maryland's policies in regards to 
promoting a broad level of discovery and how these policies point 
towards the adoption of the control group test. 18 Additionally, the 
adoption of the control group test by Maryland courts will likely 
promote a narrowing of the corporate attorney-client privilege in 
Maryland which is preferable as corporations are unlikely to 
anticipate in which venue they will ultimately face litigation; 
therefore, this will protect Maryland corporations from using the 
broader subject matter test and then ultimately facin¥. litigation in a 
venue that applies the more narrow control group test. 9 
The Comment will begin with a discussion of the history of the 
attorney-client privilege prior to Upjohn, which defined the two 
current tests.20 Next, this Comment will provide an overview of the 
Supreme Court's Upjohn decision that limited the federal courts to 
use of the subject matter test.21 The current status and continuing 
application of the control group test by various states will also be 
discussed,22 as will the modifications made to the subject matter test 
by other state COurtS.23 The effect that current events, such as the 
government's request for waivers of the attorne~-client privilege and 
the introduction of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 4 will have on the 
attorney-client privilege and how these changes could lead to the 
renewal of the control group test will also be explored.25 The 
16. See infra Part VI.A. 
17. See infra Part VI.A. 
18. See infra Part VIII.B. 
19. See infra Parts VII, X. 
20. See infra Part II. 
21. See infra Part III. 
22. See infra Part IV. 
23. See infra Part V. 
24. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002). 
25. See infra Part VI. 
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removal of the attorney-client privilege altogether has been debated 
in the past, and therefore, this option will also be considered?6 
Lastly this Comment will discuss the history of the attorney-client 
privilege in Maryland, along with public policies of the Maryland 
courts that support those policies best advanced by the control group 
test;27 therefore, the Court of Appeals of Maryland should adopt the 
control group test if faced with a choice between these two tests in 
the future. 28 
Overall, federal law related to the corporate attorney-client 
privilege is flawed due to the government's current demands for 
waivers of the corporate attorney-client privilege. The subject matter 
test also provides too much protection of corporate senior 
management and too strictly restrains discovery;29 therefore, the 
Maryland courts should adopt the control group test when inevitably 
faced with this decision in the future. 
II. THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE PRIOR TO UP JOHN 
Although the current status of the corporate attorney-client 
privilege in the United States is a result of the Supreme Court's 
Upjohn decision, a brief review of the history of the privilege and the 
decisions that came before this landmark case are important to help 
gain an understanding of how the two tests have evolved. Before the 
Supreme Court decided the Upjohn case, it was generalld' believed 
that the control group test would be the test of the future? This test 
was first applied in Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Electric Corp./i 
when Judge Kirkpatrick indicated: 
[I]f the employee making the communication, of whatever 
rank he may be, is in a position to control or even to take a 
substantial part in a decision about any action which the 
corporation may take upon the advice of the attorney, or if 
he is an authorized member of a body or group which has 
that authority, then, in effect, he is (or personifies) the 
corporation when he makes his disclosure to the lawyer and 
the privilege would apply.32 
26. See infra Part VII. 
27. See infra Part VIII. 
28. See infra Parts VIII, IX. 
29. See infra Part IX. 
30. GERGACZ, supra note 9, at 3-133. 
31. 210 F. Supp. 483 (E.D. Pa. 1962). 
32. 1d. at 485. 
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As such, members of the control group were not viewed based 
upon their place in the organization, but instead upon their authority 
to playa role in its decision making and to authorize the actions that 
the corporation would ultimately take based upon the 
recommendations of the attorney; therefore, the control group could 
consist of chief executives of a corporation as well as lower level 
managers with authority to assist in the decision-making process.33 If 
the corporate employee communicating with the employer was within 
the control group, then the communication was considered to be 
covered under the attorney-client privilege?4' 
After the introduction of the control group test by the Philadelphia 
court, there were mixed reviews of the strengths and weaknesses of 
the test. The primary advantages of the test were considered to be the 
narrowness of its scope and the predictability of its application.35 
The primary complaints regarding the control group test were that it 
was too limiting of the flow of information between corporate 
attorneys and employees, that it only protected upper level employees 
of the corporate client, and that it tried too hard to turn the corporate 
client into an individual client. 36 
The subject matter test was also in existence prior to the Upjohn 
decision. The first subject matter test was applied by the Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. 
Decker. 37 The subject matter test outlined by the Harper court is as 
follows: 
[A]n employee of a corporation, though not a member of its 
control group, is sufficiently identified with the corporation 
so that his communication to the corporation's attorney is 
privileged where the employee makes the communication at 
the direction of his superiors in the corporation and where 
the subject matter upon which the attorney's advice is 
sought by the corporation and dealt with in the 
communication is the performance by the employee of the 
duties of his employment. 38 
This test was introduced as a way around the weaknesses of the 
control group test. The subject matter test broadened the scope of 
33. GERGACZ, supra note 9, at 3-133 to -134. 
34. Id. at 3-133. 
35. Id. at 3-134 to -135. 
36. Id. at 3-135 to -136. 
37. 423 F.2d 487,491-92 (7th Cir. 1970). 
38. Jd. 
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employees who were to be covered by the privilege, acknowledging 
that employees outside of those considered to be within the control 
group may have information needed by an attorney.39 Although this 
test took into account this weakness of the control groW' test, other 
courts refused to adopt it due to its "overbreadth.'''' As such, 
multiple versions of the subject matter test came into existence prior 
to the Upjohn decision in 1981 in attempt to keep the corporate 
attorney-client privilege from becoming overly broad.'I1 
III. AN OVERVIEW OF THE UPJOHN V. UNITED STATES 
DECISION 
After the development of the control group and subject matter tests, 
each federal court independently chose which test to apply, resulting 
in many different applications of the tests among federal circuits; 
therefore, the Supreme Court finally addressed this split of authority 
in the Upjohn decision.42 In Upjohn, the Supreme Court recognized 
this lack of consensus amongst the federal circuits, as both the control 
group and subject matter tests were being followed, often in different 
forms. 43 As such, the Supreme Court, through its decision in Ujpohn, 
undertook to limit the federal circuits to the subject matter test. 
In order for the Upjohn decision to be clearly understood, a brief 
overview of the facts of this case is necessary. In the Upjohn case, 
corporate counsel for Upjohn was notified that a foreign subsidiary 
had been making "questionable payments to fore~n government 
officials in order to secure government business." An internal 
investigation of the payments was performed and questionnaires were 
sent to all foreign Upjohn managers requesting information regarding 
39. GERGACZ, supra note 9, at 3-137. 
40. Id. at 3-137 to -138. 
41. See, e.g., Diversified Indus. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 609 (8th Cir. 1978) (en bane) 
(applying an alternate version of the Harper & Row subject matter test, under which 
"the attorney-client privilege is applicable to an employee's communication if (1) the 
communication was made for the purpose of securing legal advice; (2) the employee 
making the communication did so at the direction of his corporate superior; (3) the 
superior made the request so that the corporation could secure legal advice; (4) the 
subject matter of the communication is within the scope of the employee's corporate 
duties; and (5) the communication is not disseminated beyond those persons who, 
because of the corporate structure, need to know its contents."); Duplan Corp. v. 
Deering Milliken, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 1146 (D.S.C. 1975) (applying both the control 
group test as well as the Harper & Row subject matter test). 
42. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383,386 (1981). 
43. See id. 
44. See id. at 390--97. 
45. Id. at 383. 
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the alleged payments.46 Those who received the questionnaires, as 
well as officers and other employees, were then interviewed by legal 
counsel.47 Corporate counsel voluntarily notified the Internal 
Revenue Service (IRS), and the IRS began their own investigation.48 
The IRS demanded copies of the questionnaires and notes from the 
interviews, but corporate counsel refused to provide them as they 
believed the re~uested materials were covered under the attorney-
client privilege.4 The Upjohn case ensued. 
First, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit 
applied the control group test.50 The Sixth Circuit indicated their 
concerns with the subject matter test, primarily indicating that the test 
encourages senior managers to "ignore important infonnation they 
have good business reasons to know and use.,,51 Additionally, the 
Sixth Circuit was concerned that the subject matter test was 
overbroad. 52 The court discussed their concerns with the subject 
matter test in detail, warning that it encourages corporate 
management to infonn corporate counsel only generally as to a given 
issue; therefore, corporate counsel must then discuss the transactions 
with subordinate employees at the direction of management, putting 
the full details of a given issue in the hands of corporate attorneys, 
and thereby protecting it under the attorney-client privilege. 53 The 
fear of the Sixth Circuit was that the subject matter test could 
severely limit discovery, especially in this case where the subordinate 
employees were located in foreign countries, causing the infonnation 
to be extremely burdensome to discover.54 As such, the Sixth Circuit 
declined application of the subject matter test in favor of the more 
narrow control group test.55 
However, the Supreme Court reviewed the case and overturned the 
decision of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, refusing to 
appl~ the control group test in favor of the broader subject matter 
test. 6 In its decision the Supreme Court detailed its rationale behind 





50. United States v. Upjohn Co., 600 F.2d 1223,1226-27 (6th Cir. 1979). 





56. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 391-92, 395-97 (1981). 
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rationale. 57 According to the Court, "the privilege exists to protect 
not only the giving of professional advice to those who can act on it 
but also the giving of infonnation to the lawyer to enable him to give 
sound and infonned advice.,,58 The Court also cited the ABA Code 
of Professional Responsibility, Ethical Consideration 4-1 indicating 
that: 
A lawyer should be fully infonned of all the facts of the 
matter he is handling in order for his client to obtain the full 
advantage of our legal system. It is for the lawyer in the 
exercise of his independent professional judgment to 
separate the relevant and important from the irrelevant and 
unimportant. The observance of the ethical obligation of a 
lawyer to hold inviolate the confidences and secrets of his 
client not only facilitates the full development of facts 
essential to proper representation of the client but also 
encourages laymen to seek early legal assistance.59 
As the attorney-client privilege applies to corporations, the Court 
recognized that employees outside of the traditional "control group" 
will often be the employees who hold infonnation needed by 
corporate legal counse1.60 Not only management level employees, 
but also middle and lower level employees, may actually create legal 
issues for corporations.61 As such, corporate lawyers often need to 
obtain infonnation from those employees outside of the traditional 
control group to ade'1uately advise the corporation regarding a legal 
issue being reviewed. 2 
In Diversified Industries, Inc. v. Meredith,63 this problem was 
acknowledged.64 Where a corporate legal issue involves a complex 
problem, corporate attorneys are faced with a difficult choice under 
the control group test: They can either interview lower level 
employees who may have the necessary infonnation knowing these 
communications will not be privileged, or they can interview those 
high level employees covered by the control group test knowing it 
will be difficult, if at all possible, to obtain the needed infonnation.65 
57. Id. at 390. 
58. ld. 




63. 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1978). 
64. Id. at 608-09. 
65. Id. (citing Alan J. Weinschel, Corporate Employee Interviews and the Attorney-
Client Privilege, 12 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REv. 872, 876 (1971». 
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Additionally, the Upjohn Court recognized that employees outside 
of the control group are often the employees more likely to be in need 
of legal advice from corporate counsel than those who are of higher 
authority.66 The Court indicated that the control group test "makes it 
difficult for corporate attorneys to formulate sound advice when their 
client is faced with a specific legal problem but also threatens to limit 
the valuable efforts of corporate counsel to ensure their client's 
compliance with the law.,,67 The Court noted the importance of being 
able to predict whether a communication will be protected under the 
privilege, which it believed would be better accomplished by the 
application of the subject matter test.68 
Although the majority opinion in Upjohn held that the subject 
matter test should be applied moving forward, the Supreme Court 
declined "to lay down a broad rule.,,69 Justice Burger, in his 
concurring opinion, expressed his concerns with the majority's 
decision not to define a broad rule and opined that a standard should 
have been provided by the Court.70 Therefore, Justice Burger 
formulated the following standard: 
[A] communication is privileged at least when ... an 
employee or former employee speaks at the direction of the 
management with an attorney regarding conduct or 
proposed conduct within the scope of employment. The 
attorney must be one authorized by the management to 
inquire into the subject and must be seeking information to 
assist counsel in performing any of the following functions: 
(a) evaluating whether the employee's conduct has bound or 
would bind the corporation; (b) assessing the legal 
consequences, if any, of that conduct; or (c) formulating 
appropriate legal responses to actions that have been or may 
be taken by others with regard to that conduct.7! 
Others have also attempted to detail the factors that the Upjohn 
Court intended to promote. For example, John William Gergacz 
outlined two groups of factors. 72 The first group of factors are 
"common to all claims of attorney-client privilege" and indicate that 
"[t]he communication was made to corporate counsel," "[t]he 
66. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 392. 
67. ld. 
68. ld. at 393. 
69. ld. at 386. 
70. ld. at 402 (Burger, J., concurring). 
71. ld. at 403. 
72. GERGACZ, supra note 9, at 3-153 to -154. 
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communications were made to secure legal advice from counsel," and 
"[t]he confidentiality requirements.,,73 The second group of factors 
"limit[s] the scope of corporate communications that would otherwise 
be subject to the privilege.,,74 These factors are as follows: 
1. The communication was made by a corporate employee. 
2. The communication was made upon order of the 
employee's superiors. 3. The information needed by 
counsel was not available from upper level management. 4. 
The information communicated concerned matters within 
the scope of the employee's corporate duties. 5. The 
employee was aware that the reason for communicating with 
counsel was so the corporation could obtain legal advice. 6. 
The identity and resources of the opposing party.75 
As such, the major concern with the Upjohn decision is its failure 
to identify a bright-line application of the subject matter test; 
therefore, each federal court may still mold its own version of the 
rule for attorney-client privilege as long as it follows under the 
subject matter test. An additional concern is that many state courts 
have attempted to follow the holding and apply the subject matter 
test,76 while others have adopted their own version of the subject 
matter tes~ 77 and still others have continued to apply the control 
group test. S As a result, numerous tests continue to be applied, and 
these tests can vary greatly between jurisdictions. 79 
IV. THE CURRENT STATUS OF THE CONTROL GROUP TEST 
IN STATE COURTS 
Although the Supreme Court adopted the subject matter test, which 
is now followed in all federal courts, some state courts have 
continued their adherence to the control group test even post-Upjohn. 
As of 1997, "fourteen [states had] adopted Upjohn or another subject 
matter approach and eight [had] adopted the control group test."so 
"Twenty-eight states [had] yet to decide which approach [would] 
73. Jd. 
74. Id. at 3-154. 
75. Id. 
76. Brian E. Hamilton, Conflict, Disparity, and Indecision: The Unsettled Corporate 
Attorney-Client Privilege, 3 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 629, 633 (1997). 
77. Id. at 640-44 (explaining that California, Florida, Utah, and Arizona have adopted 
variations of the subject matter test). 
78. Id. at 644. 
79. Id. at 633-46 (detailing the tests used in various states as of 1997). 
80. Id. at 633. 
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govern, as there [had] been neither a state high court ruling nor a 
statute or evidentiary rule adopted on the matter in those states.,,81 
Illinois is one example of a state that has continued to adhere to the 
control group test, even after Upjohn. In Consolidation Coal 
Company v. Bucyrus-Erie Company,82 the Supreme Court of Illinois 
held that Illinois would continue to adhere to the control group test 
even post-Upjohn.83 While the Illinois court recognized that the 
purpose of the attorney-client privilege is to promote communications 
between attorneys and clients, it refused to expand the privilege too 
far in corporate cases.84 The court was concerned that if the privilege 
was expanded to include all employees covered under the subject 
matter test, that it could serve as "an absolute bar to the discovery of 
relevant and material evidentiary facts, and in the corporate context, 
given the large number of employees, frequent dealings with la~ers 
and masses of documents, the 'zone of silence grows large. ",85 The 
court recognized Illinois' policies of "broad discovery" and "the 
ultimate ascertainment of the truth" and found the subject matter test 
to be incompatible with those state policies.86 
As a result, the court held that the privilege should be limited "to 
the extent reasonably necessary to achieve its purpose. ,,87 The 
control group test was found to be "a reasonable balance [of] 
protecting consultations with counsel by those who are the 
decisionmakers or who substantially influence corporate decisions 
and by minimizing the. amount of relevant factual material which is 
immune from discovery.,,88 The court also noted their belief that the 
benefits of the control group test are "its predictability and ease of 
application. ,,89 
This court also opined as to who would be a member of the control 
group.90 According to the opinion, an employee who advises top 
management, and whose opinion a decision normally would not be 
made without, is a member of the control group.91 If an employee is 
8l. ld. 
82. 432 N.E.2d 250 (Ill. 1982). 
83. Jd. at 257. 
84. ld. at 256-57. 
85. Id. (quoting David Simon, The Attorney-Client Privilege as Applied to Corporations, 
65 YALE L. 1. 953, 955 (1956». 




90. ld. at 258. 
9l. Id. 
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consulted in an effort to determine what action a corporate entity will 
take, then their communications are protected as a member of the 
control group.92 On the other hand, employees who those individuals 
may rely on "for supplying information are not members of the 
control group.,,93 
Illinois is not the only state that has chosen to continue to apply the 
control group test to the corporate attorney-client privilege. In 
addition to Illinois, other states have adopted the control group test, 
but most states have done so primarily through rules of evidence or 
legislation.94 The states that have adopted the control group test have 
adopted a test similar to that recognized by the Illinois Supreme 
Court in Consolidated Coal Company.95 
States which have adopted rules of evidence applying the control 
group test to the attorney-client privilege include: Alaska, Hawaii, 
Maine, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Oklahoma, and South 
Dakota.96 The rules adopted by these states indicate that "[a] 
representative of a client is one having authority to obtain 
professional legal services and to act on advice rendered pursuant 
thereto on behalf of the client.',97 Additionally, New Hampshire 
indicates in their advisory committee notes that it advocates the 
control group test as opposed to Upjohn's subject matter test because 
it is "consistent with the purpose of the privilege to encourage 
communication without unduly inhibiting trial preparation in the 
special context of corporate activity.,,98 
V. MODIFIED SUBJECT MATTER TESTS IN STATE COURTS 
The problem with the Supreme Court's Upjohn decision was its 
failure to detail a list of factors that should be used in determining 
whether a communication falls within the subject matter test. As a 
result, even while some states have chosen to adopt the subject matter 
test as discussed above under Upjohn,99 some states have adopted a 
92. ld. 
93. ld. 
94. Hamilton, supra note 76, at 640-41 
95. ld. at 633-39 (quoting the language of statutes from the eight states that have adopted 
the control group test). 
96. ld. at 633-40. 
97. See ALASKA CT. R. 503(a)(2); HAw. CT. R. 503(a)(2); ME. R. OF CT. 502(a)(2); N.H. 
R. OF CT. 502(a)(2); N.D. CENT. CODE CT. R. 502(a)(2); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 
2502(A)(4) (West 1993 & Supp. 200S); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 19-13-2(2) (1995); 
see also Hamilton, supra note 76, at 633-39. 
9S. N.H. R. Evid. 502(a)(2) advisory committee's notes. 
99. Hamilton, supra note 76, at 633. 
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modified approach to this test. IOO The Supreme Court of Arizona, in 
Samaritan Foundation v. Good/arb,101 rejected an approach to 
attorney-client privilege as it relates to a corporation that turns on the 
communicator instead of the communication. 102 The court further 
rejected the control group test because there is a distinction between 
communications made as an individual and those made as an agent of 
the corporation. 103 The control group test was thought to be under-
inclusive, as the focus is only on the communicator when there may 
be additional employees who hold relevant information; while the 
subject matter test was viewed as over-inclusive, as the focus is on 
the communication, regardless of who makes it, which may lead to 
employees who were merel.?' witnesses to such conduct being 
included under the privilege. 10 
The Good/arb court indicated that a more functional approach 
should be adopted. 105 Under this. approach, attorney-client 
communication relates only to the employee's own actions that fall 
within the scope of their corporate responsibilities. l06 The court 
formulated the rule as follows: 
[W]here someone other than the employee initiates the 
communication, a factual communication by a corporate 
employee to corporate counsel is within the corporation's 
privilege if it concerns the employee's own conduct within 
the scope of his or her employment and is made to assist the 
lawyer in assessing or responding to the legal consequences 
of that conduct for the corporate client. This excludes from 
the privilege communications from those who, but for their 
status as officers, agents or employees, are witnesses. 107 
Thus, the Arizona court's holding attempts to balance the competing 
interests of the straight forward subject matter test and the control 
group test which was rejected by the Upjohn COurt. 108 
100. See, e.g., Samaritan Found. v. Goodfarb, 862 P.2d 870, 874 (Ariz. 1993); S. Bell Tel. 
& Tel. Co. v. Deason, 632 So. 2d 1377, 1382-83 (Fla. 1994) (Florida and Arizona 
are two states whose courts have adopted modified versions of the subject matter 
test). 
101. 862 P.2d 870 (Ariz. 1993). 
102. ld. at 874. 
103. ld. at 875. 
104. ld 
105. ld. at 874. 
106. ld. at 878. 
107. ld at 880. 
108. ld. 
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Another modified approach to the subject matter test was adopted 
in Florida. I09 The Florida Supreme Court showed a concern with the 
relationship difference between corporate clients and their legal 
counsel and regular individual clients and their attorneys.IIO As 
corporate legal counsel has continuing contact with their clients 
because they often sit in the same offices, etc., it is possible that the 
"zone of silence" as a result of attorney-client communications will 
be enlarged. I I I The court tried to balance the interests of encouraging 
employees of corporations to seek legal advice from their corporate 
attorneys while ensuring that discovery of relevant information is not 
. d 112 compromIse . 
As a result of the Florida Supreme Court's concerns, it arrived at 
the following application of the subject matter test: 
[T]he attorney-client privilege applies if: (1) the 
communication was made for the purpose of securing legal 
advice; (2) the employee making the communication did so 
at the direction of his corporate superior; (3) the superior 
made the request so that the corporation could secure legal 
advice; (4) the subject matter of the communication is 
within the scope of the employee's corporate duties, and; (5) 
the communication is not disseminated beyond those 
persons who, because of the corporate structure, need to 
know its contents. I 13 
The rules of the Arizona and Florida Supreme Courts appear to 
reach the same result, while at first glance they seem to have unique 
goals. The Arizona court's primary concern was ensuring that what 
employees see and hear as witnesses is not protected under the 
attorney client privilege as this would be an extension of what is 
covered under the attorney client privilege as it relates to individual 
clients. 114 The Florida Supreme Court was primarily concerned with 
the content of the communication between the client and the attorney 
in a corporate environment due to the closeness of their working 
relationship. I IS However, upon review of the rules laid out by each 
of the courts, the outcome appears to be extremely similar, except 
that the Florida rule requires the communication to be made at the 
109. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Deason, 632 So. 2d 1377, 1382-83 (Fla. 1994). 




114. Samaritan Found. v. Goodfarb, 862 P.2d 870, 878-79 (Ariz. 1993). 
115. S. Bell Co., 632 So. 2d 1377 at 1383. 
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direction of an employee's supervisor and the Arizona rule includes a 
stipulation that the communication cannot concern information 
b . d' . 116 o tame as a wItness to an actIOn. 
VI. WAIVER OF THE ATTORNEY -CLIENT PRIVILEGE 
Even while there are many tests for the Maryland courts to analyze, 
there are additional considerations that the Maryland courts should 
consider. One additional consideration in choosing a test is the 
government's current push for waivers of the attorney-client 
privilege. Although it is primarily federal government agencies 
requesting these waivers, it is still necessary for the Maryland courts 
to consider these requests in deciding how the attorney-client 
privilege rules should be applied to corporations in Maryland. 
A. Government Waivers and How They Affect Corporate Employees 
First, one must look at how government waivers came about and 
subsequently how these waivers affect the attorney-client privilege. 
In recent years, the Department of Justice has adopted guidelines 
indicating that a corporation will not be deemed "cooperative" in a 
federal government criminal investigation of corporate conduct if it 
does not waive the attorney-client privilege and work-product 
doctrines. l17 Additionally, the U.S. Sentencing Commission noted 
that waivers of the attorney-client privilege will be used to determine 
a corporation's "culpability score," which can in tum affect how 
corporate players are eventually sentenced. I 18 As a result, 
corporations are more likely to waive the attorney-client privilege 
today than ever before. 
After the Enron scandall19 and the dismantling of the accounting 
giant Arthur Andersen,120 it is understandable that corporations fear 
116. See supra notes 106, 107, 113 and accompanying text. 
117. Lonnie T. Brown, Jr., Reconsidering the Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege: A 
Response to the Compelled-Voluntary Waiver Paradox, 34 HOFSTRA L. REv. 897, 
898 (2006). 
118. Id. 
119. Enron's stock, which traded at $85 per share, fell to $0.40 per share after the SEC 
began investigations into the company's questionable accounting practices. See 
Marianne M. Jennings, A Primer on Enron: Lessons from a Perfect Storm of 
Financial Reporting, Corporate Governance and Ethical Culture Failures, 39 CAL. 
w. L. REv. 163, 195 (2003). 
120. See James Kelly, The Power of Indictment and the Demise of Arthur Anderson, 48 S. 
TEX. L. REv. 509, 515 (2006). Arthur Anderson was the independent auditor for 
Enron and was indicted for obstructing justice in regard to its involvement with the 
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for the future of their continuing operations and, therefore, are more 
likely to cooperate with federal prosecutors. 121 However, prosecutors 
are demanding that these corporations turn over information gained 
as a result of internal corporate investigations without refard for the 
attorney-client privilege and work-product doctrines. 12 In some 
instances, corporations are even agreeing to conduct internal 
investigations on behalf of, and for the benefit of, these government 
. 123 agencIes. 
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has accomplished 
success in obtaining waivers and attempting to crack down on 
corporate scandals by passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,124 
issuance of the "Seaboard Report" in 2001,125 and the codification of 
the "Seaboard Report" in 2006. 126 The goal of the SEC in its 
adoption of the above is "easy access to all information, regardless of 
relevance, and the 'targeting' by private attorneys of corporate 
employees for the government investigators to focus upon."I27 
As a result of this increase in pressure by government agencies, 
employees of these corporations often face lose-lose situations. First, 
if the employee refuses to cooperate in the internal investigation, he 
will often face termination from his employment. 128 On the other 
hand, if he voluntarily works with corporate counsel, he risks that 
"not only will [his] statements be turned over to the government, but 
that any false statement or a failure to overtly implicate oneself will, 
in itself, lead to charges of 'obstruction of justice' or 'false 
statements. ",129 As a result, it appears that a corporation and its 
Enron scandal. Id. at 512-13 (indicating that the indictment alone was enough "to 
wipe out one of the largest accounting firms in the nation"). 
121. Marvin G. Pickholz & Jason R. Pickholz, Investigations Put Employees in Tough 
Spot, N.Y.L.J., July 24, 2006, at 10-12. 
122. Id. 
123. Id. 
124. William R. McLucas, Howard M. Shapiro & Julie J. Song, The Decline oj the 
Attorney-Client Privilege in the Corporate Setting, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
621,626-27,635 (2006). 
125. Pickholz & Pickholz, supra note 121, at 11. This report made "it clear that early 
'cooperation,' often entailing waivers of the attorney-client privilege and attorney 
work product privileges ... was expected." Id. 
126. Id.; see also Press Release, Securities and Exchange Commission, Statement of the 
Securities and Exchange Commission Concerning Financial Penalties (Jan. 4, 2006), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2006-4.htm. 
127. Pickholz & Pickholz, supra note 121, at 11. 
128. ld. at 11-12. 
129. Id. at 12. 
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attorneys investigating a corporate legal issue are "acting under the 
'color oflaw' during [their] employee interviews.,,13o 
As corporations are often acting in a position similar to that of the 
government itself, and the statements made to corporate attorneys 
may be indictable by government agencies, employees should be 
allowed to invoke their Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights or other 
rights provided under state law. 131 
As a result, the American Bar Association (ABA) is working in an 
attempt to further protect the attorney-client privilege and work-
product doctrine while also working to protect the rights of 
corporations' employees. 132 The ABA indicated its concern that if 
the corporate attorney-client privilege is allowed to be eroded by the 
government, this could lead to its erosion from all criminal and civil 
litigation, including where the privilege is protecting individuals 
instead of corporations. 133 The ABA released a statement and: 
[E]xpressed support of the attorney-client privilege and the 
work-product doctrine as being essential to maintaining the 
confidential relationship between an attorney and client. It 
is the single tool that protects full and candid conversation 
about any given case. It aids in establishing advocacy, 
promotes civil functioning of the legal system and 
guarantees the client full and equal access to justice. 134 
The ABA has also shown concern with the current policies being 
followed by prosecutors as they have led to a "lack of accountability 
in the higher ranks of corporate operations.,,135 As a result, corporate 
employees and "those least able to defend themselves end up being 
sacrificed to the system.,,136 
The ABA "opposes policies, practices and procedures of 
governmental bodies that have the effect of [eroding] the attorney-
client privilege and work product doctrine and favors policies, 
practices and procedures that recognize the value[] of those 
130. Jd. 
131. Jd. 
132. Mike Nixon, Lawyers Adopt Decree Supporting Attorney-Client Privilege, ST. LOUIS 
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protections.,,137 The ABA has also "voiced opposition" to the 
government seeking waivers of the attorney-client privilege or work-
product doctrine throueh denying or granting benefits during a 
corporate investigation. 8 In an attempt to protect employees, the 
ABA has been in discussions with federal regulators and is also 
seeing more corporate attorneys protecting their clients. 139 
B. How Waivers of the Attorney-Client Privilege Implicate the 
Choosing of a Test in Maryland 
The problem with the subject matter test is that it protects all 
communications between a corporation's attorneys and its employees 
as long as the subject matter of the communication is within the 
scope of the attorney's legal representation of the corporation.14o 
Therefore: 
By narrowing the group of corporate representatives whose 
communications would be covered by the privilege to those 
who are capable of controlling or binding the entity in some 
fashion, the privilege is necessarily focused upon the type of 
information that would most be entitled to coverage under 
the individual attorney-client privilege. 141 
The subject matter test protects communications by employees at any 
level, while those with the ability to waive the privilege are those 
employees whom would fit within the traditional control group.142 
Additionally, waiving the attorney-client privilege as to the 
government will unfortunately also waive the attorney-client 
privilege as to all other parties, including potential plaintiffs and their 
counsel. 143 The communications which are disclosed lose their 
"privileged" status; therefore, the communications would also be 
non-privileged if litigation is faced in another venue. 144 
In the Upjohn decision, the Supreme Court expressed its concerns 
with protecting employees, indicating the employees outside of the 
control group are often those most in need of legal advice from 
137. Id. (quoting ABA Task Force on Attorney-Client Privilege, Recommendation III 




140. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
141. See Brown, supra note 117, at 954-55. 
142. Jd. at 955. 
143. Id. at 947. 
144. Id. 
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corporate counsel. 145 However, as a result of the government 
requesting waivers of the corporate attorney-client privilege, 
employees believe their communications are protected as they fall 
under the subject matter test, but in reality, they are not receiving the 
protection the Supreme Court had hoped for under Upjohn. As such, 
the Supreme Court may again need to consider revising the test 
protecting communications under the corporate attorney-client 
privilege. 
Regardless of if or when the federal courts make a change, the 
Maryland courts should consider the implications of these waivers 
and consider limiting the privilege to the control group, as only those 
who have the ability to waive the privilege should be protected by the 
privilege during a suit in a Maryland court. 
C. The Control Group Test: One Proposed Solution to Government 
Requested Waivers 
There is at least one scholar who has indicated that the attorney-
client privilege needs to be reworked as a result of government 
waivers. 146 Professor Lonnie T. Brown, Jr. indicated in his article 
that: "[R ]eform efforts should be directed towards defining the 
corporate attorney-client privilege in a manner that preserves the 
protection in its most fundamental form, and encouraging the 
pertinent government agencies to commit formally to seeking waiver 
of such a privilege only in very limited circumstances.,,147 As such, 
Brown recommends the control group as a way of combating the 
issues resulting from waivers being requested by prosecutors. 148 
First, Brown defines who members of the control group shall 
include: 
A constituent of the organization who supervises, directs or 
regularly consults with the organization's lawyer concerning 
the matter or has authority to obligate the organization with 
respect to the matter or whose act or omission in connection 
with the matter may be imputed to the organization for 
purposes of civil or criminal liability. 149 
As such, only communications between those individuals falling into 
the above description and corporate counsel "regarding the subject of 
145. See supra note 66 and accompanying text. 
146. See Brown, supra note 117, at 952-53. 
147. Id. at 952. 
148. Seeid. 
149. Id. at 953 (quoting MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.2 cmt. 7 (2004». 
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the representation should be protected by the corporate attorney-
client privilege.,,150 The communications "with those employees who 
exercise managerial responsibility in the matter, who are alleged to 
have committed the wrongful acts [that are] at issue ... or who have 
authority on behalf of the corporation to make decisions about the 
course of the [representation]" would be protected under the control 
group test. lSI 
Many corporate employees likely believe that their 
communications with corporate counsel will be protected under the 
corporate attorney-client privilege as they fall within the protections 
afforded by the subject matter test,152 not knowing that the privilege 
can be waived by those employees who fall within the control 
group. 153 As such, protection under the attorney-client privilege 
should likely be limited to those who have the ability to waive the 
privilege, i.e. those belonging to the control group; and therefore, as a 
result of the government requesting waivers of the attorney-client 
privilege, the resurrection of the control group test may be imminent. 
VII. ARGUMENTS FOR DENYING THE ATTORNEY -CLIENT 
PRIVILEGE TO CORPORATIONS ALTOGETHER 
Although it is now clear that the attorney-client privilege applies to 
corporations, prior to Upjohn, there were some scholars and even 
courts which argued that the privilege should not apply to 
corporations at all, limiting it solely to individuals. 154 As such, this 
argument must also be considered for a comprehensive analysis of 
the corporate attorney-client privilege. For example, in Radiant 
Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Association,155 the United States 
District Court, Northern District of Illinois stated that as there are 
thousands of persons with access to corporate information, the 
attorney-client privilege cannot reasonably be expanded to 
corporations. 156 
Additionally, it has been argued that the expansion of the attorney-
client privilege to corporate clients is too complex and confusing, and 
150. Id. 
151. Id. at 953 (alterations in original) (quoting Messing, Rudavsky & Weliky, P.e. v. 
President & Fellows of Harvard CoIl., 764 N.E.2d 825, 833 (Mass. 2002». 
152. See id. at 955. 
153. See id. 
154. Id. at 924. 
155. 207 F.Supp. 771 (N.D. III. 1962). 
156. Id. at 775. 
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therefore, it should not be adhered to in the corporate context. 157 
Drawing a line between legal advice and business advice is often 
difficult to do, and as only le~al advice falls within the privilege, the 
privilege is difficult to apply. 8 
Another consideration in the applicability of the attorney-client 
privilege in the corporate context is the difficulty of knowing in 
advance where an issue may be litigated. 159 As corporate 
transactions often occur across multiple venues, and as different 
federal and state courts apply different tests, the law to be applied, 
and ultimately which test will be applied, can be difficult if not 
impossible to predict. 16o 
Other reasons for abandoning the attorney-client privilege in 
corporations have also been noted. First, employees and officials 
often believe that the privilege is designed to protect them as 
individuals; 161 however, this is dangerous as in reality it is only an 
"illusion.,,162 A corporation will likely protect itself ahead of an 
employee, thereby waiving the attorney-client privilege, which could 
in turn incriminate the employee. 163 The privilege also comes from 
the right to individual autonomy, however, corporations are not 
persons and are not protected by the same rights; therefore, the 
argument has been made that the privilege should not be expanded to 
protect corporations. 164 
While questioning the continuation of the application of the 
attorney-client privilege to corporations has been discussed and 
analyzed, "[t]he legal community has overwhelmingly answered the 
question of whether the privilege should be recognized in the 
corporate context with a resounding 'yes. ",165 Even in the Supreme 
Court's Upjohn decision, the imgortance of the corporate attomey-
client privilege was discussed. I The Supreme Court noted that 
"[t]he privilege recognizes that sound legal advice or advocacy serves 
public ends and that such advice or advocacy depends upon the 
157. See generally Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Sanctifying Secrecy: The Mythology of the 
Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 157 (1993). 
158. Id. at 167. 
159. Id. at 170. 
160. Id. at 170-71. 
161. See id. at 173-74. 
162. Id. at 174. 
163. SeeidatI73-74. 
164. Id. at 183-85. 
165. Brown, supra note 117, at 924. 
166. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389-90 (1981). 
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lawyer's being fully infonned by the client.,,167 Additionally, the 
Court acknowledged: 
[C]omplications in the application of the privilege arise 
when the client is a corporation, which in theory is an 
artificial creature of the law, and not an individual; but [the] 
Court . . . assumed that the privilege applie[ d] when the 
client is a corporation .... 168 
Instead of contemplating the denial of applying the privilege in the 
corporate context, the bigger "concern has been with regard to the 
proper scope and characteristics" of the privilege. 169 As a result, the 
corporate attorney-client privilege is likely to continue in the future. 
VIILCURRENT STATUS OF THE CORPORATE ATTORNEY-
CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN THE STATE OF MARYLAND 
In addition to the adoption of various versions of the subject matter 
test by various states, the control group test by others, and the 
demand of waivers of the privilege by government agencies, there is 
additional history regarding the attorney-client privilege within 
Maryland that must be considered for Maryland courts to best decide 
which test should be applied. 
A. A Brief Overview of the Attorney-Client Privilege as Applied by 
the Maryland Courts 
A discussion of the rationale for the different attorney-client 
privilege tests may be of significant importance in Maryland in the 
future. However, before the Maryland courts are to choose a test, the 
courts must consider how the attorney-client privilege has been 
applied in Maryland %' to today. In E.l. du Pont de Nemours & Co. 
v. Forma-Pack, Inc., 1 the Court of Appeals of Maryland noted "we 
decline to adopt a particular set of criteria for the application of the 
privilege in the corporate context until we are required to do SO.,,171 
As such, the rules set out by the courts above are all possible 
outcomes if, or more likely when, the Maryland courts are forced to 
choose between the tests and establish a clear test to detennine what 
communications are covered under the corporate attorney-client 
privilege. 
167. Id. at 389. 
168. Id. at 389-90; see a/so United States v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 236 U.S. 
318,336 (1915). 
169. Brown, supra note 117, at 924-25. 
170. 391 Md. 396, 718 A.2d 1129 (1998). 
171. Id. at 421,718 A.2d at 1141. 
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Maryland's current statute on attorney-client privilege is very 
broad, generic in scope, and reads as follows: "A person may not be 
compelled to testify in violation of the attorney-client privilege.,,172 
Outside of this statute, all other attorney-client privilege guidance has 
been developed through case law. The Court of Appeals of Maryland 
developed the following definition of the attorney-client privilege in 
Harrison v. State: 173 
(1) Where legal advice of kind is sought (2) from a 
professional legal adviser in his capacity as such, (3) the 
communications relating to that purpose, (4) made in 
confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his instance 
permanently protected (7) from disclosure by himself or by 
the legal adviser, (8) except the protection be waived. 174 
In E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland compared the attorney-client privilege to the work-product 
doctrine, noting that the attorney-client privilege is to be narrowly 
construed while the work-product doctrine is to be broadly 
construed. 175 The court indicated that the rationale behind narrowly 
construing the privilege is because its application ma~ have the effect 
of withholding information from the finder of fact.I 6 Additionally, 
"[ c ]ommunications [with in-house counsel] with regard to business 
advice are unprotected. When the attorney-client privilege is invoked 
with regard to communications with in-house counsel, the courts will 
look particularly closely at whether counsel was providing business 
advice, rather than legal advice or services.,,177 
Accordingly, in E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., the 
communications were examined according to the above outlined 
rules. 178 In this case, Dupont argued that its communications with 
Kaplan & Kaplan (Kaplan) in regard to debt collection efforts were 
covered under the attorney-client privilege as Kaplan was serving as 
172. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 9-108 (LexisNexis 2006). 
173. 276 Md. 122,345 A.2d 830 (1975). 
174. ld. at 135, 345 A.2d at 838 (quoting 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE 
ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW INCLUDING THE 
STATUTES AND JUDICIAL DECISIONS OF ALL JURISDICTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES AND 
CANADA § 2292 (3d ed. 1940)). 
175. E.l. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 Md. at 406,718 A.2d at 1134 (citing Leonen v. 
Johns-Manville, 135 F.R.D. 94, 96 (D.N.J. 1990)). 
176. ld. at 415, 718 A.2d at 1138. 
177. ld. at 422, 718 A.2d at 1142 (alterations in original) (quoting 5 LYNN McLAIN, 
MARYLAND EVIDENCE § 503.9, at 493 (1987)). 
178. ld. 
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an agent of the Dupont legal department. 179 However, the Court of 
Appeals of Maryland held that Dupont hired Kaplan to act in a 
"business capacity" as opposed to a "legal capacity," and therefore, 
the attorney-client privilege was not applicable.180 As such, the Court 
of Appeals of Maryland declined to adopt a test (either the control 
group or the subject matter test) as the communications being 
considered in this case were not protected under the privilege as they 
were made in merely a business capacity. 181 Since this decision, 
there have been no other Maryland decisions discussing the 
application of the various corporate attorney-client privilege tests. 
B. A Discussion of the Policy Goals of D~scovery and the Attorney-
Client Privilege in Maryland 
In an effort to determine which test, the subject matter or the 
control group, should be applied by the Maryland courts, Maryland's 
policy goals of discovery and the attorney-client privilege should be 
examined. The Court of Appeals of Maryland also discussed the 
goals of Maryland's discovery rules in E.I. du Pont de Nemours & 
Co. 182 According to the court, Maryland's discovery rules "are 
premised on a philosophy encouraging liberal disclosure.,,183 The 
court also noted that the "discovery rules are deliberately designed to 
be broad, comprehensive in scope and liberally construed.,,184 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland stated the following in Klein v. 
Weiss: 185 
One of the fundamental and principal objectives of the 
discovery rules is to require disclosure of facts by a party 
litigant to all of his adversaries, and thereby to eliminate, as 
far as possible, the necessity of any party to litigation going 
to trial in a confused or muddled state of mind, concerning 
the facts that give rise to the litigation. 186 
Additionally, in another case, the same court also indicated the 
following purposes in allowing for pretrial discovery: "(i) [T]o 
acquire accurate and useful information with respect to testimony 
179. 1d. at 403-04, 71S A.2d at 1132-33. 
ISO. Jd. at 422, 71S A.2d at 1142. 
lSI. Jd. at 421-22, 71S A.2d at 1141-42. 
IS2. See id. at 405-06, 71S A.2d at 1133-34. 
IS3. Jd. at 405, 71S A.2d at 1133; see also Bait. Transit v. Mezzanotti, 227 Md. S, 13, 174 
A.2d 76S, 771 (1961). 
IS4. £,1. du Pont de Nemours, 351 Md. at 405, 71S A.2d at 1133. 
IS5. 2S4 Md. 36, 395 A.2d 126 (I 97S). 
IS6. Jd. at 55, 395 at 137; see also Bait. Transit, 227 Md. at 13, 174 A.2d at 771. 
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which is likely to be presented by an opponent, (ii) to obtain 
information which appears reasonably calculated to lead to the 
discovery of admissible evidence, and }iii) to use as an aid in cross-
examining the opponent's witnesses.,,18 
The Maryland courts have also held that a party resisting a 
discovery request by asserting a privilege, such as the attorney-client 
privilege, "bears the burden of establishing its existence and 
applicability.,,188 Additionally, the Maryland courts have noted that 
the attorney-client privilege is to be narrowly construed. 189 
Although the Maryland courts have specifically declined to choose 
a test, the policies outlined in Maryland case law may serve as clues 
that indicate what choice the Maryland courts would make if faced 
with such a decision in the future. Maryland's policy goals of the 
attorney-client privilege combined with the decisions in other states 
and the current concerns of forced waivers of the privilege may 
provide the necessary clues in predicting how the Maryland courts 
will apply the attorney-client privilege in the future. 
IX. THE FUTURE OF THE ATTORNEY -CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN 
MARYLAND-IS THE CONTROL GROUP TEST ONCE 
AGAIN DESTINED TO BECOME THE TEST OF THE 
FUTURE? 
As discussed above, the Maryland courts have numerous choices 
and much scholarly material to comb through once they are forced to 
decide how to go forth in applying the attorney-client privilege to 
corporations. The courts will need to decide if they will choose to 
follow the subject matter test that has been recommended and applied 
by the Supreme Court since the Upjohn decision,190 another version 
of the subject matter test that has been followed bi a federal court or 
a various state court/91 or the control group test. 19 
First, Maryland's discovery goals as well as its policies in relation 
to the attorney-client privilege must be compared to the goals of the 
varying tests. Maryland promotes liberal discovery and designs rules 
187. Kelch v. Mass Transit Admin., 287 Md. 223, 231, 411 A.2d 449, 454 (1980). 
188. E.I. du Pont de Nemours, 351 Md. at 406,718 A.2d at 1134; see also Maxima Corp. 
v. 6933 Arlington Dev. Ltd. P'ship, 100 Md. App. 441, 456, 641 A.2d 977, 984 
(1994); In re Criminal Investigation No. 1I242Q, 326 Md. 1, 11, 602 A.2d 1220, 
1225 (1992). 
189. E.I. du Pont de Nemours, 351 Md. at 406,718 A.2d at 1134. 
190. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.s. 383 (1981); see discussion supra Part Ill. 
191. See supra Part IV. 
192. See supra Part Ill. 
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to promote broad discovery.193 Additionally, Maryland courts have 
indicated that the attorney-client privilege should be narrowly 
construed. '94 Therefore, Maryland courts are likely to choose a test 
that allows discovery to be broad and keeps the attorney-client 
privilege narrow. 
Based on these Maryland discovery policy goals, the Maryland 
courts will likely follow in the footsteps of the Illinois Supreme 
Court, which chose to follow the control group test, even post-
Upjohn,195 as this test was chosen to further promote Illinois' goals of 
broad discovery.l96 The control group test is narrow in scope and 
offers the benefits of broad discovery and predictability of 
application,197 while the subject matter test provides broader 
protection of attorney-client communications while further promoting 
these communications as they are protected. 198 
Although Maryland's discovery goals likely lead to the application 
of the control group test, today's corporate environment and the 
demanding of waivers of the attorney-client privilege even further 
promote the control group test. One concern with the granting of 
waivers of the attorney-client privilege to government prosecutors is 
that this is leading to a lack of accountability amongst senior 
management of large corporations. 199 As a result, lower level 
employees are being sacrificed and turned over to prosecutors while 
upper level management is not held accountable for their role or lack 
thereof in the matter. 200 A similar concern was voiced with regard to 
the subject matter test in the original Upjohn decision by the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit when it applied the control 
group test in favor of the subject matter test, in that the subject matter 
test causes senior management to ignore information gained in an 
attempt to place the employee in a situation where they must 
communicate with corporate counse1.201 As such, the subject matter 
test, in combination with the government attorney-client privilege 
waivers, seems to provide unprecedented protection to senior 
management while leaving lower level employees out in the cold 
193. See supra notes 183-84 and accompanying text. 
194. See supra note 189 and accompanying text. 
195. See supra note 83 and accompanying text. 
196. See supra note 86 and accompanying text. 
197. See supra notes 35, 89 and accompanying text. 
198. See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
199. See supra note 135 and accompanying text. 
200. See supra note 136 and accompanying text. 
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when they believe their communications with counsel are protected, 
only for "control group" members to later waive the privilege. 
In an attempt to counter these government re~uested waivers, bar 
associations of numerous states are fighting back. 02 Maryland is one 
state included in a group of states, along with Arkansas, Florida, 
Illinois, Massachusetts, Michigan, and New York, pushing for the 
revocation of these waiver requests,203 To prevent the requests of 
these waivers, states are doing such things as changing their Rules of 
Professional Conduct "to prohibit government attorneys practicing 
[in the state] from requesting that companies waive their attorney-
client privilege to prove they are cooperating with the Jaovernment 
probe" in an effort to protect the attorney-client privilege. 4 
The problem with the attorney-client privilege and the information 
obtained through internal corporate investigations is that employees 
"may have no idea that they are providing information likely to go to 
federal prosecutors, or that they may be forfeiting the Fifth 
Amendment's protection against self-incrimination by providing 
information to counsel conducting the interviews" as the privilege 
can be waived by the corporation as it belon?s to the corporation, 
which is the client, and not to the employee.2o As such, employees 
are more likely to provide information to their employer or a 
corporation's attorney due to "an employee's sense of duty or loyalty 
to her employer, her relationship to attorneys she either knows or 
knows to be representing her employer, or the absence of 
admonitions so commonly associated with questioning that may lead 
to arrest or other law enforcement consequences," so they often 
provide the requested information freely with little questioning.206 
After obtaining such information, a corporation may choose to waive 
the attorney-client privilege, providing prosecutors with "all kinds of 
information-including potentially incriminating statements-from 
people who might otherwise decline to speak with prosecutors, FBI 
agents, or other government investigator~."207 As such, "[t]here is no 
reason to believe that employees at any level understand without 
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explanation that lawyers working for their emplo~er ... may readily 
metamorphose into de facto government agents.,,2 8 
Counsel is only required to inform employees of who in fact is the 
client during an internal investigation "when it is apparent that the 
organization's interests are adverse to those of the [employee].,,209 
Additionally, it is often difficult for counsel to know if the 
employees' interests are adverse to the corporation's until after the 
investigation and communication has begun; therefore, counsel will 
not likely reveal to employees that the6' are not the client until after 
incriminating information is revealed.21 
Another potential issue is that even if an attorney tries to 
communicate to an employee that he is not the client, employees 
"may be anxious to appear knowledgeable, or erroneously believe 
that they understand counsel's role" and "[on] the basis of past 
experience they may believe that counsel will seek to protect both the 
individual and the corporation.,,211 As such, some now believe that 
counsel should be required to provide employees with pre-interview 
statements to ensure that they understand the attorney's role, similar 
to "Miranda warnings in the law enforcement context.,,212 
As employees often believe that a corporate attorney represents 
them as an individual, they, therefore, are of the belief that their 
communications to the attorney are protected under the attorney-
client privilege. One way· to prevent this belief would be to scale 
back the attorney-client privilege in the corporate context and again 
follow the control group test. Under this test, only those employees 
who have the authority to obligate the corporation, act in a 
supervis0g' capacity, or regularly consult with legal counsel are 
protected. 13 As such, everyday, average employees would not be of 
the belief that their communications with counsel are protected under 
the attorney-client privilege. Ultimately, application of the control 
group test, coupled with a pre-interview statement indicating that the 
employees' statements are not protected under the privilege would 
best protect employees and their rights against self-incrimination. 
The control group test also better allows the corporate attornezY-
client privilege to resemble the individual attorney-client privilege. 14 
208. ld. 
209. ld. at 938 (emphasis added) (alteration in original) (quoting MODEL RULES OF PROF'L 
CONDUCT R. 1.13 cmt. 11 (2003)). 
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Historically there has been some concern that the corporate attorney-
client Rrivilege expands the rights afforded to individuals as 
clients. 15 Some have noted concern that the subject matter test 
protects corporate employees who are not involved with the 
underlying cause of action but serve merely as fact witnesses.216 As 
facts surrounding litigation are not covered under the individual 
client privilege, it is desirable to choose a test that limits the 
protection of facts surrounding litigation, precisely what the subject 
matter test threatens to protect.217 As such, adopting a control group 
test that is expanded to include emRloyees whose actions may be 
imputed on the corporation in a suir will best protect the corporate 
attorney-client privilege from being expanded above and beyond the 
individual attorney-client privilege while preventing protection of 
communications between counsel and mere fact witnesses that limit 
discovery. 
One last consideration that should point courts, not only in 
Maryland but also in federal and other state courts, towards once 
again adopting the control group test is the issue of cross-
jurisdictional practice and a corporation's multi-jurisdictional 
presence. As corporations cross state borders, and as one lawsuit can 
lead to another, the issue of multiple tests in regard to the attorney-
client privilege in the corporate environment becomes even more 
difficult.219 Today, some states continue to apply the control group 
test, while others follow the U.S. Supreme Court's lead in Upjohn in 
applying the subject matter test. As such, there is a "lack of 
uniformity between the states in this regard [that] poses a major 
problem for national corporations with presences in various 
jurisdictions. ,,220 There is even concern in the federal courts as to 
which rule applies. As the "federal courts must apply state privilege 
rules in a diversity case based on state law, the corporate attornex 
may not know which test will be applied to the communication.,,2 I 
Therefore, for corporations to ensure that the communications will be 
protected in each and every venue where a case could arise, they 
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should follow the narrowest test, the control group test. 222 The 
Upjohn Court indicated the need to ensure the predictability of 
whether or not a communication will be protected when it chose the 
subject matter test;223 however, application of the narrowest test helps 
to ensure predictability of what communications will be protected, as 
attorney can only ultimately ensure communications will be protected 
if they follow the more narrow control group approach. As a result, 
if Maryland follows this recommendation and applies the control 
group test, the courts will be protecting not only attorneys, but 
corporate employees and their beliefs as to which communications 
are protected by applying a more narrow test which the corporation 
may alternatively face in another jurisdiction. 
x. CONCLUSION 
Although the United States Supreme Court held that the subject 
matter test should be used for analyzing the attorney-client privileBe 
when it involves corporations, a bright-line rule was not provided. 4 
As such, federal courts are left to interpret the ruling as they see fit. 
Additionally, the Supreme Court's ruling is not binding on individual 
states; therefore, a variety of rules in this area of law have been 
established, including continued adherence to the control group test 
that was rejected in Upjohn and the adoption of various forms of the 
subject matter beyond the test adopted by the Upjohn Court. As 
Maryland courts have yet to decide which rule to apply, any of the 
above options could be applied and adopted by the Maryland courts 
in the future. 
However, the control group test seems to provide the most 
protection of corporate employees, while promoting Maryland's 
policy goals surrounding pre-trial discovery. After the corporate 
scandals of recent years, the SEC and other government agencies are 
requiring that corporations waive the attorney-client privilege in 
order for the corporation to receive favorable treatment during an 
investigation.225 As a result, employees may be under a false sense of 
protection under the subject matter test while providing information 
to legal counsel, whom employees often believe will protect them as 
they are their co-workers and friends, during corporate 
investigations.226 As such, the control group test is more likely to 
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protect employees as their communications would normally not be 
covered under this test to begin with; therefore, employees will be 
more inclined to protect themselves against self-incrimination during 
corporate investigations. The Maryland courts should adopt the 
control group test as federal law related to the attorney-client 
privilege is flawed-government agencies are requesting too many 
waivers of the privilege, the subject matter test provides too much 
protection of senior management, and the subject matter test too 
strictly restrains discovery in violation of Maryland's policy goals. 
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